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Abstract: As China modernizes, its waste management capacities are put to a test. Faced 
by significant pressures to find a solution for growing municipal solid waste, China’s 
authorities have embraced waste incineration technology as a seemingly cost-efficient 
alternative to landfills. Against this push, significant societal opposition against the 
construction of waste incinerators has been mounting. Yet while some incinerators attract 
collective resistance, others do not. The Nangong Incinerator, planned for construction in 
Beijing’s Daxing district, has remained relatively free from controversy. Simultaneously, 
it is markedly different from other incinerators in the capital due to the involvement of an 
international investor. Based on an intrinsic single case study, the present thesis 
investigates this puzzling phenomenon by examining the relationship between a group of 
local environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and the German state-
owned development bank Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau. In the course of the analysis, 
it is suggested that (1) the relation between international actors and local ENGOs is 
marked by initial optimism but deteriorates fast due to excessive expectations, (2) local 
ENGOs act as “policy entrepreneurs” in seeking to co-opt the international actor in the 
struggle for grander environmental concerns, (3) communication between the two parties 
represents a competition over narratives, and (4) while the relation between local ENGOs 
and international actors is complicated by limited action action, it has potential to be an 
axis of de-escalation in siting controversies. 
Keywords: facility siting, environmental politics, Fragmented Authoritarianism, 
Nangong waste incinerator, China, NIMBY 
 iv 
Table of Contents 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................. vi 
1. Introduction .....................................................................................................1 
1.1 Research Question ....................................................................................2 
1.2 Research Aim ............................................................................................2 
1.3 Delimitation ..............................................................................................2 
1.4 Disposition ................................................................................................3 
2. Literature Review............................................................................................3 
2.1 Siting as a Policy Issue .............................................................................3 
2.2 Siting in the Literature ..............................................................................5 
2.3 Siting in China ..........................................................................................6 
2.4 Thesis Contributions .................................................................................7 
3. Methodology ...................................................................................................8 
3.1 Critical Realism ........................................................................................8 
3.1.1 Thesis Implications .......................................................................9 
3.2 Research Strategy....................................................................................10 
3.2.1 Qualitative Approach ..................................................................10 
3.2.2 Case Study ..................................................................................11 
3.3 Research Design......................................................................................12 
3.3.1 Case Selection .............................................................................12 
3.3.2 Propositions.................................................................................13 
3.3.3 Data Collection ...........................................................................13 
3.3.4 Reporting the Analysis ................................................................13 
3.4 Evaluation Criteria ..................................................................................14 
3.4.1 Construct Validity .......................................................................14 
3.4.2 External Validity .........................................................................14 
3.4.3 Reliability ....................................................................................15 
3.5 Reflections ..............................................................................................15 
 v 
3.6 Ethical Considerations ............................................................................15 
4. Analytical Framework: Fragmented Authoritarianism .................................16 
4.1 The Emergence of Opportunities ............................................................16 
4.1.1 Analytical Proposition I ..............................................................19 
4.2 Policy Entrepreneurs ...............................................................................19 
4.2.1 Analytical Proposition II .............................................................20 
4.3 Issue Framing ..........................................................................................20 
4.3.1 Analytical Proposition III ...........................................................21 
5. Analysis.........................................................................................................21 
5.1 Setting the Stage: Waste Incineration in Beijing ....................................22 
5.2 Case Study: Siting the Nangong Incinerator ...........................................24 
5.2.1 Proposition I: Policy Entrepreneurs ............................................26 
5.2.2 Proposition II: Issue Framing......................................................30 
5.2.3 Proposition III: The Emergence of Opportunities ......................33 
6. Discussion .....................................................................................................38 
7. Conclusion ....................................................................................................40 
8. Bibliography .................................................................................................41 
9. Annex ............................................................................................................50 
  
 
  
 vi 
List of Abbreviations 
BMCCAE Beijing Municipal Commission of City Administration and Environment  
BMEDI Beijing Municipal Engineering Design and Research Institute 
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment 
ENGO  Environmental Non-Governmental Organization 
EPB  Environmental Protection Bureau 
FA  Fragmented Authoritarianism 
FON  Friends of Nature 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GTAI  Germany Trade and Invest 
KfW  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
LULU  Locally Unwanted Land Uses 
MSW  Municipal Solid Waste 
NIMBY Not In My BackYard 
PX  Paraxylene 
SGFCF Sino-German Financial Cooperation Framework 
WTE  Waste-to-Energy 
  
 1 
1. Introduction 
As China modernizes, its waste management capacities are put to a test. Having long 
overtaken the USA as the biggest producer of municipal solid waste resulting from the 
twin processes of industrialization and urbanization, China’s leaders are faced with an 
ever-increasing amount of waste to be managed (Qian, 2009). 
In the search for alternatives to currently dominating landfills, authorities have 
increasingly looked towards waste incineration as a cost-efficient, environment-friendly 
waste management strategy (Yu, 2011) . 
Yet despite the potential advantages of incineration technology, their operation has come 
under significant scrutiny by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) 
and concerned citizens. Fearing adverse health and environmental effects, strong societal 
opposition has emerged against poor operational management, lacking official 
supervision and weak enforcement of existing legal provisions (Johnson, 2013). 
Nowhere is the clash between rising siting pressures and local opposition more visible 
than in Beijing, where the local government announced plans to construct several waste 
incinerators within the period of the 11
th
 and 12
th
 Five-Year Plan for the National 
Economic and Social Development of Beijing. All projects caused significant 
controversies and attracted several independent anti-incineration campaigns, some of 
which have been successful in preventing the construction (Liulitun) while others have 
not (Gaoantun) (Ibid.). 
One of Beijing’s planned incinerators, designated for construction in Nangong, Daxing 
district, is markedly different from the other projects due to the involvement of an 
international actor in the financing and monitoring process. While the Nangong 
incinerator attracted the first Chinese anti-incineration campaign directly targeting a 
foreign investment bank between the announcement of the project in 2010 and the 
finalization of its planning process in 2013, societal opposition has remained weak. 
This puzzling feature – international investment accompanied by the simultaneous 
absence of opposition – forms the research problem which will be investigated by 
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examining the interaction between international stakeholders and Chinese ENGOs amidst 
siting pressures for authorities on the one hand, and growing political space for civil 
society actors in China on the other. 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The outlined research problem will be addressed by asking the following research 
question about the Nangong waste incinerator in Daxing, Beijing, China: 
 
How do ENGOs and international actors interact in Chinese siting processes? 
 
Furthermore, the thesis will be guided by the following sub-question: 
Does international involvement represent a potential solution to siting 
controversies? 
1.2 RESEARCH AIM 
In answering these questions, this thesis attempts to add context-dependent knowledge to 
existing discussions about facility siting in China. Specifically, the thesis aims to 
contribute to siting discussions on structurally conducive or preventive factors in the 
development of conflict by examining the dynamics and practices of ENGO-investor 
relations. This will be achieved through an intrinsic single case study based on qualitative 
primary and secondary data. Due to the unexplored nature of the subject, this thesis draws 
heavily upon previous research on facility siting and environmental governance in China 
while grounding its analysis in Kenneth Lieberthal and Andrew Mertha’s Fragmented 
Authoritarianism.  
1.3 DELIMITATION 
As of the publication of this thesis, the project had finalized planning. Hence, the analysis 
focuses on investigating the relationship between international actors and environmental 
NGOs as a potential solution to siting conflicts in the time period between announcement 
(2010) and planning finalization (2013). 
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As will be articulated in the body of this thesis, siting processes are inherently 
multidimensional and complex. Constrained by limited access to both state actors and 
local residents, this thesis neglects the decision-processes leading to the geographical 
allocation of the project, the relations between Chinese state actors and the international 
investor, and local community resistance. 
1.4 DISPOSITION 
Following the introduction into this research project, chapter 2 justifies the present thesis 
by identifying a knowledge gap in current research, and outlines aspired contributions to 
scholarly debates. Subsequently, chapter 3 deals with the methodological approach on 
how to this contribution will be achieved. Ensuing, chapter 4 consists of the development 
of three analytical propositions by discussing Fragmented Authoritarianism. These 
propositions form the anchor against which the collected data will be analyzed in chapter 
5. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the findings, briefly explores rival explanations 
and suggests further research. This thesis concludes in chapter 7.  
2. Literature Review 
Siting issues have received considerable exposure in the literature. However, scholarly 
work has for a large part, albeit not exclusively, considered siting processes in 
industrialized democracies. Academic discussions of siting in emerging economies and 
non-liberal systems remain limited. This thesis attempts to address this knowledge gap 
through empirical work on Chinese siting processes. 
2.1 SITING AS A POLICY ISSUE 
Siting facilities is a policy problem faced by governments throughout the world. 
Confronted with the necessity to meet a population’s demands for public and human 
services, bureaucrats have to make decisions on where to construct facilities which are 
beneficial for a common population, but impose real or perceived risks on local 
communities (Schively, 2007). In the absence of academic consensus, various theories on 
how these locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) are geographically allocated within a 
 4 
nation’s territory span technocratic/physical criteria, partisan discrimination (Ramseyer & 
Rosenbluth, 1993), environmental racism (Pastor, Sadd, & Hipp, 2001), economic 
blessing (Mohai & Bryant, 1992) and civil society concentration (Aldrich, 2008; Quah & 
Tan, 2002).  
Regardless of a site’s location, LULUs often attract opposition from local communities 
whose manifold concerns include, but are not limited to health risks, declining property 
value, quality of life impairment due to odors, noise, etc. and environmental hazards 
(Schively, 2007). Occurring under conditions of sufficient levels of political opportunity 
and resource availability (Flam, 1994), this type of opposition, aimed at keeping a 
proposed facility out of one’s home community, has frequently been referred to as 
NIMBY (not in my backyard). The constantly negotiated, value-laden acronym
1
 is often 
associated with selfish, irrational opposition to projects deemed necessary for the public 
good, potentially passing on harmful projects to poorer, less organized communities
2
. In 
contrast, NIMBY-protests can also be valued as a rational response to actual or perceived 
risk, compelling decision-makers to incorporate public opinion into facility siting 
decisions (Takahashi & Dear, 1997), forcing changes “in how society as a whole chooses 
and manages certain technologies” (Piller, 1991, p. 170), and being “a triumph of 
Western democracy, as virtuous citizens band together in search of political and 
environmental justice and usher in an era of ‘ecodemocracy’” (Rabe, 1994, p. 2). 
States respond to these oppositions with a variety of regulatory, market-based and 
voluntary approaches in which concrete risk-mitigating instruments such as 
compensation, risk communication, consensus building, empowerment of impact bearers, 
and institutional mechanisms are employed (Lesbirel & Shaw, 2005, p. 4; Schively, 2007, 
p. 260 f.). Revolving around the “perceived value of projects to developers and 
community interests” (Lesbirel & Shaw, 2005, p. 2), these tools are used to reshuffle 
risks for developers (uncertainty over capital cost escalations due to inflation and interest 
repayment burdens), public authorities (wary of NIMBY gridlock, the state in which a 
                                                 
1 For an excellent discussion of the persistence of NIMBY, see Wolsink (2006). 
2 For instance, the widely publicized protests against a paraxylene plant in Xiamen, China, ultimately 
forced the relocation of the project into the less wealthy and less organized Zhangzhou area. 
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project fails because on community accepts it), and communities (fearing adverse 
environmental, social and economic impacts) (Lesbirel and Shaw, 2005). 
2.2 SITING IN THE LITERATURE 
In investigating these complex issues, facility siting studies reflect the “effort of social 
scientists in producing knowledge by seeking to account for issues, processes and 
outcomes involved in the siting of a wide range of facilities” (Lesbirel, 2007, p. 4). 
Displaying widely differing ontological, epistemological and methodological 
perspectives, the literature has evolved significantly since its infancy in the 1970s when 
discussions were almost exclusively confined to North America. From seeing siting as a 
policy issue which could be approached by using state-centered coercive and 
technological approaches
3
 (see Padgett, 1993; Schively, 2007) to acknowledging the 
complex political and social dimensions of the problem and witnessing “the end of 
American Technological Optimism” (Piller, 1991), the literature made a paradigmatic 
shift by including crucial variables such as risk (Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, & Aarts, 1993), 
trust (Kasperson, Golding & Tuler, 1992), perceptions (of impacts, participants and the 
siting process itself; see Schively, 2007, pp. 257-259), and legitimacy into the siting 
equation. 
This contextual expansion has occurred parallel to a geographical expansion. Following 
intensifying NIMBY-occurrences within its borders, both Europe and Japan (see 
Kawashima, 2000, & Aldrich, 2008) were incorporated into the literature’s focus. 
Pursuant, NIMBY-controversies in rapidly developing Taiwan (see Hsu, 2006), South 
Korea and Hong Kong
4
 increased in number due to high population densities and rising 
siting pressures, and subsequently attracted considerable academic attention (Lesbirel & 
                                                 
3 Much of it can be summarized by the then-dominant DAD-approach to siting (decide, announce, defend). 
4 See the proceedings of the “International Conference on The Siting of Locally Unwanted Facilities: 
Challenges and Issues”, organized by the Chinese University of Hong Kong here: 
http://ceprm.grm.cuhk.edu.hk/LULU/Publications/CUHK_Proceedings.pdf  
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Shaw, 2000). Recently, the literature has seen attempts of being transformed into a truly 
international level.
5
 
Notwithstanding considerable progress, these scholarly debates remain particularly 
limited with regard to siting processes in emerging economies and authoritarian systems, 
as most of the knowledge production has been achieved through empirical and theoretical 
work on liberal, industrialized democracies. China, in this regard, is no different. 
2.3 SITING IN CHINA 
While casual empiricism suggests a growing power and frequency of local opposition to 
unwanted facilities in China which has led some analysts to assume “the rise of the 
Chinese NIMBY” (Zheng, 2011), reminders of the state’s capacity in preventing protests 
and backlashing once initial turmoil has calmed remain vivid and numerous. Among 
others, controversial projects such as the Xiamen, Dalian and Ningbo PX plants, the 
Nujiang dam cascade, the Panyu (Guangzhou) and Liulitun (Beijing) waste incinerators, 
the Shifang copper smelter, or the Qidong wastewater pipeline have caused significant 
local opposition and subsequently drew both media and academic attention, as well as 
strong state responses. Scholarly inquiries into Chinese siting issues focus on 
technological solutions (Deng, Yu, & Liu, 2011; Wang, Li, Qin & Chen, 2009), identify a 
rising environmental awareness in the Chinese population (Thibaut, 2011, p. 142), reveal 
a growing, yet largely ineffective set of protesting tools for individuals (Cai, 2008, p. 
110; Lai, 2010, p. 829 ff.), sketch the fragmented and localized nature of these protests 
(Hess, 2011, p. 56), and emphasize the crucial role of intermediaries and protest leaders 
in environmental protests (van Rooij, 2010, p. 57).  
Focusing on waste management issues, Johnson (2013) correspondingly concludes that 
“scholarly understandings of municipal solid waste management (MSWM) controversies 
are almost exclusively confined to cases from advanced industrialized democracies (p. 
110). While the MSWM framework is rapidly improving, challenges remain particularly 
                                                 
5 Lesbirel and Shaw’s co-edited volume on “Managing Conflict in Facility Siting: An International 
Comparison” (2005), as well as Fung, Lesbirel & Lam’s edited volume on “Facility siting in the Asia-
Pacific: perspectives on knowledge production and application” (2011) represent welcomed efforts to 
develop siting literature into a global one. 
 7 
with regard to implementation processes (Chen, Geng & Fujita, 2010). The positive role 
of participatory communities vis-à-vis a lacking state willingness of accommodating civil 
society demands is emphasized (Li, Liu & Li, 2012), while the tactics, dynamics and 
natures of different anti-incineration campaigns in China have been signified as revealing 
the limitations of top-down policy (Lang & Xu, 2013; Johnson, 2013).  
2.4 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS 
The production of knowledge in Western contexts does not render scholarly progress 
obsolete. In contrast, I see fertile ground for the inclusion of established variables and 
correlations into the study of siting processes in emerging and authoritarian systems. 
Nonetheless, certain accomplishments of siting discussions might not be applicable and 
warrant context-specific inquiries. As Lesbirel (2005) assumes, “in democratic countries, 
communities are generally powerful enough to delay or stop the development of projects 
that they perceive to be risky” (p. 4). Is the same claim, by extension, false for non-
democratic systems? Against this background, Morell and Magorian’s conclusion that 
governments are able to “strip away at the legal power of communities, but they cannot 
strip away their political power” (as cited in Lesbirel & Shaw, 2005, p. 8-9) might not 
hold for non-liberal systems.  
Current knowledge of siting processes in China is thoroughly incomplete, particularly 
with regard to MSWM challenges and the role of international actors. Consequently, 
there is a need to amend existing research on facility siting by supplementing it with 
contextual, empirical work into Chinese siting processes. I thus concur with Lesbirel’s 
(2007) conclusion that “while the siting literature can offer and has provided useful 
insights, the challenge will be to build on all these achievements by addressing several 
theoretical and empirical shortcomings in ways which seek to enhance its utility to 
practitioners” (p. 15)  This thesis sees its contribution in addressing the latter challenge 
by conducting empirical work on the changing nature of environmental campaigns in the 
wake of international actor involvement, based on an analytical framework capturing the 
Chinese policy process, all the while relating it back to existent knowledge on facility 
siting.  
 8 
3. Methodology 
This chapter presents the critical realist meta-theoretical foundation of this study, 
motivates a qualitative approach and single case study design, and discusses relevant 
evaluation criteria. Before concluding this chapter with an outline of ethical issues, a 
brief reflection of the research process will be offered. 
3.1 CRITICAL REALISM  
Ontological assumptions influence epistemological, theoretical and methodological 
approaches, necessitating transparent meta-theoretical statements (Moses & Knutsen, 
2007). My research takes its ontological point of departure in critical realism, which 
criticizes Popperian predictive validity statements for being generated in experimental 
“closed systems” who escape the researcher’s availability in the social sciences (Bhaskar, 
1978, p. 69 ff.). Critical realism further challenges other research philosophies for a 
perceived “epistemic fallacy”, defined as the reduction of ontology – the domain of being 
– to epistemology, the realm of knowing. By assuming the existence of some 
“subjective” domains of truth outside scholarly accessibility, empiricism and positivism 
are governed by an epistemic superiority which claims all things accessible as objective, 
while all things inaccessible remain subjective (Fopp, 2008). In contrast, critical realism 
advocates a shift from a perceived anthropocentric epistemology to a governing ontology.  
Assuming both a real physical and a real social world existing as independent phenomena 
which are impossibly reduced to human knowledge constructions, critical realism views 
the social world as existing in dependence on human action, while the physical world 
does so independently (Bhaskar, 1978; Bhaskar, 1998).  
Critical realism parts from positivism in rejecting truth as being observable via the 
establishment of predictive patterns by problematizing research not distinguishing 
between causality and correlation. In contrast, it shares much common ground with social 
constructionist ideas, and diverges clearly only with radical, early Latourian denials of 
the existence of underlying structures and subsequent assumptions of structures as results 
of generative, hence constructive practices of researchers (Latour & Woolgar, 1989). 
 9 
Correspondingly, critical realism assumes theories to represent an act of formalization of 
structures, whereas social constructionism postulates the generation of theories. Lastly, 
critical realism emphasizes empirical replication (Bhaskar, 1978, p. 14) which 
constructionism does not. However, both “weak constructionism” and critical realism 
assume a real world, which for the former is accessible via language, whereas the latter 
depends on science and scientific theories. As such, the most crucial difference lies in its 
epistemological assumptions.  
Critical realism deconstructs reality into the “empirical” (the observable), the “actual” 
(things independently transpiring outside researcher’s ideas), and the “real” (mechanisms 
that produce surface phenomena). Scientific activities, which are a social construction
6
 in 
contrast to the mechanisms under study (Bhaskar, 1998, p. xii), assume a generalizing 
task and should be keen on identifying the “real” by exploring the relationship between 
what we experience, what actually happens, and how these events are produced 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, 39 ff.). According to critical realism, social research seeks 
abstraction, understood as penetration of surface phenomena to disclose the “real” by 
focusing on some things while others remain in the (momentarily) neglected background 
(Lawson, 1997, p. 227; Fairclough, 1995). To reach abstraction, critical realism 
advocates, among others, the use of pathological cases (Danermark, Ekstrom & Jacobsen, 
2002), which this thesis adheres to. 
3.1.1 Thesis Implications 
Critical realism subsumes an affinity towards qualitative methods and an interest in 
synthesis and context, both of which will be addressed through the production of context-
dependent knowledge and the communication of findings in this thesis.  
According to critical realism, reality can be represented by scholarly work through a 
process of abstraction. To reach abstraction, critical realism advocates, among others, 
pathological case inquiries (Danermark et. al., 1997, p. 158 ff.). As will be outlined in 
subsequent sections, this research adopts a case study design through which a siting 
                                                 
6 In critical realism, social constructions (such as discourses and scientific work) are not “less real” than the 
natural world since they reflect an objective reality and have real consequences. 
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process which was conceptualized as a “model case” will be inquired. Additionally, the 
case features the involvement of an international stakeholder as financer, caused the first 
anti-incineration campaign directly targeting a foreign investment bank in contemporary 
China, and has not caused strong social resistance while three other incinerators in the 
same city have. Accordingly, I deem the case to be of pathological nature. 
Critical realism implies ontological certainty with epistemological uncertainty. While the 
philosophy adheres to the notion of human-related things being socially constructed
7
, 
these constructions are no less real than mind-independent realities (Danermark et al., 
2002, p. 26). Accordingly, preconceived notions and values of the researcher are 
recognized as crucial elements in the collection, formalization and communication 
process of this research. Nonetheless, they do not present confounding obstacles due to 
the transparent communication of research strategies and outcomes. While the outcomes 
of this research cannot lay conclusive claim to revealing the “real”, generated findings 
may nonetheless contribute to a “deeper understanding of contextual tendencies“ 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 41). 
3.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
In this sub-section, a justification for the adoption of a qualitative approach and a single 
case study design will be offered. 
3.2.1 Qualitative Approach 
Attributable to different facilities involved, diverging participants and interests, as well as 
varying characterizations of NIMBY and LULU phenomena, siting processes are 
inherently complex (Schively, 2007, p. 256). Additionally, as argued in chapter 2, facility 
siting in China remains heavily under-researched. In order to gain entry into these 
contextualized and complex types of phenomena, Schroder, Drotner, Kline & Murray 
(2003) recommend the use of qualitative methods. This is largely due to qualitative data 
having several advantages over quantitative data, which Graebner, Martin & Roundy 
                                                 
7 For a compelling argument of scientific knowledge as discursively constructed, see Jørgensen and Phillips 
(2002, p.175). 
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(2012) frame as open-ended, concrete and vivid, and rich and nuanced (p. 278). Hence, 
the nature of qualitative data appears suitable to satisfy critical realism’s interest in 
contextual relations. 
3.2.2 Case Study 
Yin (1994) deems case studies to be a manifestation of a qualitative approach, which is 
appropriate for inquiries into a “contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, 
especially when (2) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident, and (3) in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (p. 13). Affording 
researchers the use of several data sources which supplement and cross-reference each 
other in a process of triangulation enables reaching a holistic understanding of a studied 
phenomenon. Ideally, the data yielded through various collection methods displays a 
significant breadth and rich resource for the analysis (Creswell, 2007; Silverman, 2010). 
In addition, case studies are judged an appropriate strategy when the research issue is 
extreme, unique, or can reveal something special (Rowley, 2002), similar to critical 
realism’s suggestion to investigate pathological cases. 
While cases studies and qualitative methods are frequently associated with an inductive 
approach in the “development of ‘more structured’ tools that are necessary in surveys and 
experiments” (Rowley, 2002, p. 16), inductive studies more often than not feature 
deductive elements such as the use of constructs, propositions and theoretical concepts 
deduced from existing literature (Denis, Lamothe & Langley, 2001). This thesis 
represents a work of induction while being based on the deductive element of a 
theoretically-informed analytical framework.  
In Stake’s terminology, the style of the study represents an intrinsic case study, which is 
signified by inquiring a unique situation (international actor involvement/absence of 
resistance) with limited transferability (seeking to generate context-dependent 
knowledge) (1995). 
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The present thesis design represents an inductive single case study. Since cases represent 
“a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
p. 25), researchers do well in “binding” their case by time and place (Creswell, 2003), 
time and activity (Stake, 1995), or definition and context (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
This thesis adopts Miles & Huberman’s suggestion, examining the siting process of the 
Nangong incinerator from announcement (2010) to planning finalization (2013) with a 
particular focus on ENGO-investor relations, while neglecting state actors and local 
residents. This unique perspective of the siting process takes into account the evident 
lessons from various siting controversies in the past:  frequently, a siting process is not 
complete with the decision for a project’s location due to societal opposition occasionally 
forcing the project to be relocated or entirely abandoned. The single case study method 
has been adopted due to time and access constraints, as well as Eysenck’s (1976) 
recommendation that “sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look 
carefully at individual cases—not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope 
of learning something” (p. 9). 
3.3.1 Case Selection 
Strategically selecting the “right” case for the study is imperative. Flyvbjerg urges 
researchers to choose atypical/extreme cases (as does critical realism) based on their 
respective richness in information, adding that these cases activate more actors and more 
basic mechanisms in the situation studied (2006). Following Flyvbjerg’s suggestion of 
information-oriented selection, the Nangong case was identified due to both the 
international finance of the project, the subsequent campaign directly targeting the 
investor, and the puzzling absence of social resistance in Nangong compared to other 
waste incinerators in Beijing which all caused strong social opposition.   
 13 
3.3.2 Propositions  
Both Yin (1994) and Stake (1995) suggest that propositions8 are necessary elements in 
case study research in that both lead to the development of a conceptual framework that 
guides the research, limit the scope of inquiry, and suggests possible links between 
phenomena. Based on a speculative reading of existing literature, I correspondingly 
develop propositions grounded in Fragmented Authoritarianism in chapter 4. 
3.3.3 Data Collection 
Both primary and secondary data was collected in a three-stage process. Firstly, I 
reviewed scholarly literature on facility siting and environmental politics in China to 
achieve a preliminary understanding of my research topic. Secondly, I carried out field 
research in Beijing, China from March 4
th
, 2013 until April 8
th
, 2013 during which I 
conducted two semi-structured interviews with two key leaders of the campaign against 
the Nangong incinerator in their respective offices as well as obtaining the partially 
unpublished correspondence between the campaign-leading NGO and the German state-
owned development bank KfW. Interviewees were chosen via purposive sampling and 
according to English language capabilities. The semi-structured approach was employed 
to structure the conversation enough to stay on topic while allowing space for 
interviewees to voice own interpretations and ideas (Bryman, 2004, p. 321). Thirdly, I 
cross-referenced generated data with policy papers, newspaper articles and scholarly 
literature to contextualize relevant findings, and conducted a phone interview with the 
KfW’s project manager.  
3.3.4 Reporting the Analysis 
In summarizing main findings, one may lose the “rich ambiguity” of a problem 
(Nietzsche as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 273). and the “very value of the case study, the 
contextual and interpenetrating nature of forces […] when one tries to sum up in large 
and mutually exclusive concepts” (2001, p. 260). In circumventing fashion, the analysis 
                                                 
8 Stake (1995) refers to propositions as “issues”, though he essentially means the same construct. 
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will be structured as an analytical narrative around previously established propositions to 
convey both the “complexities and contradictions of real life” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 237). 
3.4 EVALUATION CRITERIA 
A primary objective of the vast majority of academic endeavors is a high degree of 
validity, generalizability, and reliability – both in the natural and social sciences. Yet 
while research in the natural sciences can artificially create experimental conditions to 
achieve high-confidence cause-and-effect relationships, the social sciences have little 
options to control extraneous and confounding variables. This section details steps taken 
to ensure validity and reliability as prescribed by Yin (2003, p. 34). 
3.4.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity reflects the suitability of both the instruments to study a certain object 
of academic inquiry, as well as the object itself to reveal the reality of the research focus 
(Yin, 2003, p. 35). An integral strategy to attain these goals is to remain flexible with 
regard to topic and method selection and use different data sources. Both triangulation of 
various data sources (interviews, documents, news sources) and several shifts in research 
focus have occurred during the research process. In this regard, a presentation of an 
earlier draft of this thesis at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at Copenhagen 
University has led to significant changes. Hence, the interaction with fellow scholars, 
colleagues and interview subjects has been instrumental with regard to identifying both 
feasible and rewarding research areas.  
3.4.2 External Validity 
This thesis modestly aims to contribute context-dependent knowledge to siting 
discussions in China through a single case study, which, according to Flyvbjerg (2006),  
is “especially well-suited to produce this knowledge” (p. 229). Bryman (2008) and 
Creswell (2007) share Flyvbjerg’s notion in viewing the facilitation of a better 
understanding of complex interactions in specific settings as legitimate academic 
endeavors. Nonetheless, the thesis lays claim to its findings being of value for other 
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situations, and intends to reach confidence in its findings through high degrees of rigour, 
transparency and explicitness.  
3.4.3 Reliability 
Reliability approximates the possibility of repeating the study while obtaining the same 
results. Referring to an analogy of math exams being focused not only on results but on 
how a student arrived there, Holliday (2002) asserts that “the rigor in qualitative research 
is in the principled development of strategy to suit the scenario being studied” (p. 8). In 
seeking a maximum amount of transparency, explicitness and rigor, I hope to present 
readers with a solid opportunity to judge the dependability of the present thesis. It is 
nonetheless speculated that senior researchers with official affiliations and Chinese 
language proficiency could have nuanced the study’s outcome through the inclusion of 
government voices, but more importantly community perspectives. 
3.5 REFLECTIONS 
According to Yin, researchers should “continually discuss their research design and 
interpretations with colleagues in order to guard against error and bias” (as cited in 
Bailey, 1992, p. 52). Subsequently, this research has been discussed both with scholars 
from Peking University and Lund University, students at Lund University and 
Copenhagen University, and with scholars from the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. 
Comments received have been imperative and change-inducing for the current study’s 
design.  
3.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Following Swedish research regulations, an informed consent form
9
 was presented to 
interviewees prior to conducting an interview. After encouraging respondents to carefully 
read the form, a signature was collected to demonstrate the respondents’ willingness to 
participate in the study. It was made clear that at any point during the interview, the 
recorder which was used to allow for accurate replication of written words could be 
                                                 
9 See Annex. 
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turned off. Anonymity was guaranteed at any time during the research process. 
Immediately after an interview, a transcription occurred (during the phone interview with 
the KfW’s project manager, extensive notes were taken). Any information which could 
be used to identify respondents has been omitted on the recording, the transcript and the 
thesis.  
4. Analytical Framework: Fragmented Authoritarianism 
This chapter features the development of analytical propositions based on Fragmented 
Authoritarianism (FA). At its core, FA (Lieberthal, 1992; Mertha, 2008, 2009) subsumes 
the following assumptions: reflecting an increasing pluralization of the Chinese policy 
process, political spaces have emerged in China’s polity as a result of institutional 
decentralization processes and the empowerment of sub-central administrative units. 
Primarily at the implementation level, these spaces are occupied by actors previously 
excluded from the policy process who engage in bargaining processes with bureaucratic 
units and influence politics from the bottom-up. As policy entrepreneurs, these actors 
frame and re-frame issues in order to advance own ideas and interests.  
The motivation for adopting this model capturing the Chinese policy process is two-fold: 
firstly, “siting is a significant policy issue” (Lesbirel, 2007, p.3, own emphasis), 
necessitating a policy-inquiring approach. Secondly, pursuant to my argument of 
supplementing siting debates with contextual inquiries into local siting realities as voiced 
in chapter 2, the model is distinctly “Chinese” in describing the changing dynamics of 
political decision-making in contemporary China.  
4.1 THE EMERGENCE OF OPPORTUNITIES  
Fragmented Authoritarianism takes its point of departure in the initiation of economic 
reforms in China during the late 1970s. As a result of these wide-scale changes, 
administrative responsibilities and budgetary authorities were partially transferred from 
central to provincial and local levels. Entailing both rising opportunities and challenges 
for bureaucratic sub-units to develop and defend political capital in the form of budget-
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generating capacities, this institutional decentralization allowed bureaucratic sub-units to 
use resources (e.g. industrial bases) and authorities as political capital in informal 
negotiations between different-level bureaucratic actors (Bachman, 1992, p. 1057). The 
resulting transformation of previously passive bureaucratic actors into active participants 
of the Chinese policy process, along with the accompanying phenomenon of authority 
overlaps between vertical (tiao) and horizontal (kuai) lines of bureaucratic authority 
(such as regional environmental protection bureaus vis-à-vis local governments) has been 
deemed a causal mechanism between structural conflict and political change (Tsai,  2006, 
p. 121). Henceforth, the formerly one-directional, top-down Chinese policy process 
shifted towards enabling bureaucratic actors to influence policies from the bottom-up. 
This was particularly evident at the implementation level, as Balme (2011) argues in his 
study on China’s response to climate change: causally relating China’s increased 
institutional complexity and multi-directional policy process with having created an 
“implementation gap”, the central leadership became increasingly constrained in their 
control over local political entities, thereby fostering acceptance of relatively critical 
media coverage of environmental problems (p. 51 f.). While these developments 
increased the complexity of the institutional system, they nonetheless represented an 
opportunity for cooperative policy results by aggregating diverging interests into a 
cohesive whole (Ibid.). Against this background, Rock (2002) argues that institutional 
gaps at the implementation level have enabled environmental considerations to be 
integrated into industrial policy proposals based on bottom-up initiatives (p. 1441). This 
perspective is shared by Lema & Ruby in their analysis of the Chinese wind industry 
(2007), in which the authors credit increasing political pluralization with having enabled 
the evolution of a healthy incentive environment, encompassing market regulations and 
effective policy coordination (p. 3884 ff.). As Mertha (2009) concludes, “outcomes are 
shaped by the incorporation of interests of the implementation agencies into the policy 
itself” (p.996). 
Formerly a closed system, these changes in China’s institutional structure in combination 
with growing civil liberties afforded previously excluded actors “a key resource 
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necessary to compete […] within the policy process: the existence of the spaces” 
necessary for them to operate without being snuffed out by the coercive apparatus of the 
state” (Mertha, 2009, p. 996-997, own emphasis). 
These spaces, a key concept of FA, could effectively be occupied by local bureaucratic 
actors. Using these spaces, however, was not limited to merely implementing established 
policies differently. Rather, local actors found themselves in a situation where policies 
could not just be changed or vetoed, but also initiated. Hammond’s (2011) study of social 
security systems in Shanghai, for instance, recognizes bureaucratic actors as responding 
to institutional spaces with the initiation of innovative policies (p. 82, 86 ff.). 
Occupying these spaces gave rise not only to successful policy innovation, but also 
vetoing and – in the eyes of the central leadership – misinterpretation of implementation 
directives (Ibid., p. 71). Nonetheless, the relative gain in power for administrative sub-
units vis-à-vis the central leadership remained limited as the latter continues to control 
key competencies such as the issuing of policy blueprints and having an information 
advantage, particularly with regard to infrastructural projects (Naughton as cited in 
Lieberthal, 1992, p. 12).  
Notwithstanding these differences between central leadership and bureaucratic sub-units, 
the emergence of spaces as a result of fissures in China’s polity have enabled varying 
actors to compete for and against policies.  
Competing for these policies, and in contrast to the late Mao-period when bureaucratic 
appeals and the articulation of regional interests were both problematic due to potential 
political scrutiny and insensible due to the Cultural Revolution’s disruption of available 
resources (Bachman, 1992, p. 1057), actors responding to emerging fissures in China’s 
polity have increasingly been shaped by bargaining as the dominant means of reaching 
decisions. While this is true for most political systems, it is particularly pronounced in the 
Chinese policy process: most visible when material resources are concerned (Lieberthal, 
1992, p. 17 f.), as indicated by the comparatively little ratio of bargaining in non-
economic sectors (Ibid.), informal bargaining processes increase in scope and magnitude 
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due to absent political opposition and on-going problems with the rule of law (Bachman, 
1992, p. 1057 f.), and occur in the aforementioned spaces.  
Furthermore, the paradigmatic shift away from communication and implementation 
mechanisms such as mass mobilizations, ideological campaigns and wide-spread 
repression has resulted in a loss of political instruments for the central leadership’s 
bureaucratic governance, and by extension reinforced the necessity to engage in 
bargaining with sub-units (Ibid., p. 1058).  
Conceptualizing China’s jurisdiction as a multi-directional, multi-arena system, Tanner 
(1994) finds evidence of bargaining behavior in the form of content change, watering 
down, and redefinition not only at the local/provincial level, but also between party 
center, state council and national people congresses (p. 383 f.). Likewise, Lampton 
(1992) deems bargaining to be the dominant form of authority relationship in China, 
having remained “a key feature of the system” after 1989 and growing in importance (p. 
34). Nonetheless, the system’s growing institutionalization has been judged by some 
scholars as a main factor conducive to regime resiliency (Nathan, 2003).  
4.1.1 Analytical Proposition I 
Based on an increasingly decentralized institutional structure, new opportunities have 
emerged for members of China’s bureaucracy. Through bargaining processes, interests 
are weighed against each other and have led to increasing bottom-up dynamics in the 
Chinese policy process. 
With respect to my analysis, I transform these notions into the first analytical proposition 
which shall be called “The Emergence of Opportunities”. 
4.2 POLICY ENTREPRENEURS  
While Lieberthal limited his analysis of bargaining actors to members of the bureaucracy 
within China’s polity, Mertha responded to large-scale administrative reforms in 1998 
and growing social activism and protests by extending the original theoretical model with 
the introduction of the concepts of policy entrepreneurs and issue framing.  
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With domestic and foreign policy processes being shaped by various actors, Mertha 
(2009) asserts that policy entrepreneurs occupy emergent spaces in China’s policy 
process in order to promote own agendas in the hope for future returns (p. 997). 
Previously excluded, they range from actors within the polity (disgruntled officials using 
their political cover to advance institutional interests and discard notions of being 
obsolete in times of administrative downsizing), semi-state institutions (a media shaped 
by increasing budgetary freedom implying a dependence on higher advertisement 
revenues through increased circulation figures, and thus progressive reporting), to civil 
society organizations (NGOs often staffed by media-experienced personnel owing to the 
two sectors responding to the same fragmented authoritarian system (Yang, 2005), as 
well as individual citizens pursuing individual goals through mobilizing coalitions 
(Mertha, 2009, p. 997).  
In a study on housing policy in Guizhou province, Zhu (2012) emphasizes the role of 
individuals in local policy innovation. Largely depending upon the generation of a 
coalition through framing the issue and mobilizing support, a single local official 
successfully influenced local policy innovation (p. 197). The study also highlighted a key 
aspect of policy entrepreneurs’ motivations, i.e. the primary intention not being to simply 
resist and prevent policies, but to “contribute to a recasting [of the policy] that takes their 
considerations into account” (Mertha, 2008, p. 155).  
4.2.1 Analytical Proposition II 
Policy entrepreneurs are thus active members of the Chinese policy process, assume 
plethoric existences, and seek wide-spread changes to existing policy. The analytical 
proposition shall simply be called “Policy Entrepreneurs”. 
4.3 ISSUE FRAMING  
Despite the intrusion of new actors into the political arena, policy entrepreneurs operate 
in an authoritarian environment from the inside, seldom with external support. 
Henceforth, they are constrained in their available means of action. While the state 
remains advantaged concerning access to information and communications infrastructure 
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(Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011, p. 441 f.), it has lost its monopoly on framing issues and 
the dispersion of narratives due to the advent of new communication technology, 
transforming formerly one-directional information flows into a multi-dimensional 
communication (Diamond, 2010, p. 69-72; Esary & Qiang, 2011, p. 300 ff.) and a media 
catering to various audiences (Nathan, 2003, p. 12). 
Notwithstanding the state’s adaptive capabilities in responding to these challenges (King, 
Pan & Roberts, 2012, p. 29), this has enabled policy entrepreneurs to adopt a strategy of 
issue framing through articulation and amplification. Constantly renegotiating red lines, 
they are active in articulating existing problems (and thus influencing the problem 
definition level of the policy process), re-framing existing narratives (e.g. through the use 
of homophones such as “strolls” for protest and “river crab” for harmonious”), and 
amplifying issues through the dissection of existing official narratives and creation of 
competing counter-narratives (Mertha, 2009, p. 998). Most significantly, the act of issue 
framing not only impacts agreed policies in the implementation process, but “expands the 
sphere of political conflict” into the policy-making domain (Schattschneider as cited in 
Mertha, 2009, p. 999).  
4.3.1 Analytical Proposition III 
Subsequently, I conclude that policy entrepreneurs use the practice of issue framing in 
their struggle for influence. The corresponding section in the analysis shall be called 
“Issue Framing”.  
5. Analysis 
This chapter sketches the current state of waste incineration in China, introduces the 
Nangong Incinerator project, and subsequently analyses the relations between local 
ENGOs and the KfW according to previously established propositions. 
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5.1 SETTING THE STAGE: WASTE INCINERATION IN BEIJING 
Dealing with municipal solid waste (MSW) has loomed large on the horizon for Beijing’s 
administration in recent years. Driven by rapid population growth as well as rising GDP 
and income levels, growing amounts of MSW are piling up and represent one of the most 
serious environmental, but also administrative issues for the capital (Johnson, 2013). 
Seeking alternatives to existent waste management systems in order to avoid a “garbage 
crisis” (Qian, 2009), waste incineration has been embraced by a variety of governmental 
actors, including Beijing’s municipal government. This is largely due to waste 
incineration possessing several advantages over other MSW management systems: 
incinerating waste requires heat, which can be used to generate energy (hence the term 
waste-to-energy, WTE); incinerators occupy far less space than landfills do (which is a 
major concern in densely populated mega-cities like Beijing), and odor control is easier. 
Other forms of waste treatment are not without disadvantages, either: landfills often 
release bad-smelling odors and can release methane, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, 
nitrogen, hydrogen sulfide and ammonia (Xiao, Bai, Ouyang, Zheng & Xing, 2007, p. 
24).  
Nonetheless, opponents to waste incineration claim that releases of carcinogenic 
substances are just as well found in waste incinerators, that these substances do not halt at 
legally afforded safety zones (in some cases travelling as far as the United States, see 
Bradsher, 2009) and that it undermines other, more sustainable form of waste treatment 
such as reduction and recycling (Johnson, 2013, p. 109).  
Despite inherent challenges in operating waste incinerators, China is pursuing a waste 
treatment strategy in which incineration occupies a prominent place – similar to 
industrialized nations in the 1970s (Johnson, 2013, p. 110). According to Zhang Yi, 
Director of the Shanghai Environmental Engineering Design Institute, China intends to 
have 300 incinerators in operation by 2015, effectively doubling the percentage of waste 
incinerated to almost 25% (of all treated waste) in just four years (Yu, 2011). In Beijing, 
this strategy has been particularly pronounced: after Chen Yong, head of the Beijing 
Municipal Commission of City Administration and Environment (BMCCAE) publicly 
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stated that Beijing was facing a “waste crisis”, the BMCCAE released plans of 
constructing 9 incinerators within the capital’s administrative boundaries by 2015 (Yong 
as cited in Johnson, 2013, p. 113). 
Social resistance against this incineration push has been strong and particularly visible in 
larger cities. At least 10 instances of collective resistance against waste incinerators have 
been documented in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Jiangsu between 2007 and 2011 
(Yu, 2011). Fear of adverse health effects, dissatisfaction with non-existent transparency 
or public participation opportunities in decisions pertaining the location and operation of 
incinerators, and environmental concerns are among the driving forces leading to anti-
incineration collective action (Rootes, 2009).  
In a culmination of these struggles, China saw its first-ever legal court case of a private 
individual against a company operating a waste incinerator in 2010. Xie Yongkang and 
his lawyer Liu Jinmei, suspecting the close proximity (190 meters) of a waste incinerator 
in Hai’an to be related to the former’s son’s disability, uncovered the absence of 
environmental inspections or a waste discharge permit for the incinerator. However, they 
ultimately failed to overcome the high legal obstacle of providing evidence of the causal 
relationship between dioxin and cerebral palsy (Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution 
Victims, 2012).   
While Xie’s lawsuit was not successful, it sent a strong message throughout the nation: 
not only were waste incinerators potentially dangerous, not only were they sometimes 
operated without proper licensing agreements, but that legal action was possible against 
the operating companies (Ibid.; Wang, 2011).  
Well-functioning incinerators do exist in China; however they regularly impose 
significantly higher costs on operators. The Baoan incinerator in Shenzhen, for instance, 
reports almost no pollutants due to tight emission controls, but its operation costs are as 
much as ten times higher. At least as a partial result of high operating costs, a study by 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences revealed that out of 19 waste incinerators surveyed in 
2009, 16% did not meet China’s safety standards, while almost 70% failed to meet EU 
standards (Xu & Zhang, 2012). 
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It was in this context of an incineration-embracing government, resisting population and 
ensuing clashes between authorities and local communities that the siting of the Nangong 
incinerator took place. Having emerged as part of a wider phenomenon of localized 
protests in China since 1978 (Perry & Selden, 2003), anti-incinerator campaigns have 
been partially successful in preventing top-down approaches to siting waste incinerators 
(Johnson, 2013). The following section will detail how the siting of the Nangong 
Incinerator relates to this context. 
 
5.2 CASE STUDY: SITING THE NANGONG INCINERATOR 
On May 6
th
, 2010, the Beijing General Municipal Engineering Design & Research 
Institute (BMEDI) published an announcement for the Beijing Nangong Municipal Solid 
Waste Incinerator (hereinafter referred to as Nangong Incinerator) on their institution’s 
website.
10
 Operated by BMEDI, the Nangong Incinerator will be financed with EUR 55 
Million out of a total investment of approximately EUR 99 Million by the German state-
owned development bank Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit 
Institute, hereinafter KfW).  
The Nangong Incinerator project falls into the long-standing Sino-German Financial 
Cooperation Framework (SGFCF) between the two countries, in which the KfW acts as 
the implementation agency. Scheduled for the start of operations in late 2014 (Poyry, 
2010), the Nangong Incinerator is owned by the Beijing Municipal Commission on City 
Administration and Environment (BMCCAE), financed to a large degree by the KfW, 
operated by BMEDI, and monitored by the international consulting & engineering firm 
Poyry. As of the publication of this thesis, the planning process of the project has been 
concluded with the successful tendering of technical equipment for the construction 
(KfW Project Manager, personal communication, 17/05/13). 
It was not until two years after the project’s announcement that a group of 21 Chinese 
ENGOs and 16 citizens (hereinafter referred to as the “group of ENGOs”) sent an open 
                                                 
10 See the announcement here (in Chinese): http://www.bmedi.cn/qydt/qyyw/6973.shtml 
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letter to KfW’s head office in Frankfurt, Germany and its regional field office in Beijing, 
China. Sent and published on August 30
th
, 2012, the letter details concerns about waste 
incineration technology and its application in China, skepticism towards the incinerator’s 
suitability at its designated position in Beijing’s southern Daxing district, and highlighted 
existing problems in the operation of the Nangong composting plant which range from 
lack of supervision, odor discharge and low-quality, improperly sorted waste.  
Comprising a list of Beijing-transcending, environmental institutional heavyweights 
including Friends of Nature (FON), Eco Canton, Yunnan Green Watershed, Green 
Anhui, etc. and prominent citizens such as Feng Yongfeng (founder of Green Beagle & 
Nature University), Zhao Zhangyuan (formerly with the State Environmental Protection 
Agency), Bo Li (executive director of FON), etc., the letter represents a serious, well-
researched effort in engaging the KfW as a responsible stakeholder. The open letter 
marks the first time in China’s history that ENGOs have started a campaign directly 
targeting an overseas investment bank (Xu & Nan, 2012). 
Drawing upon previously established propositions, the following section details the 
interaction between the KfW and the group of ENGOs that unfolded in the siting of the 
Nangong Incinerator, which revolves around an initial open letter of the group of ENGOs 
from August 8
th, 2012 (“ENGO letter 1”)11, a KfW response on August 27th, 2012 (“KfW 
response 1”)12, an open letter response from the group of ENGOs on September 11th 
(“ENGO letter 2”)13, and an unpublished response from the KfW on November 26th, 2012 
(“KfW response 2”). These correspondences represent the majority of interaction 
between the two parties, except for a meeting on September 4
th, 2012, in KfW’s Beijing 
office.  
The analysis of the interaction between the two parties will be structured according to 
established propositions, though in reverse order to allow for better readability and a 
more stringent argument. Commencing with a discussion of the group of ENGOs as 
                                                 
11 ENGO letter 1 has been removed from its original destination at 
http://www.lingfeiqi.cn/plus/view.php?aid=871, but can still be accessed here: 
http://news.newclear.server279.com/?p=5205 
12 KfW response 1 can be found here: http://www.fon.org.cn/uploads/attachment/81621346310354.pdf  
13 ENGO letter 2 can be found here: http://www.lingfeiqi.cn/plus/view.php?aid=882 
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policy entrepreneurs, the ensuing section reviews how practices of issue framing have 
signified the relations between the group of ENGOs and the KfW. Subsequently, the 
context in which the interaction between the two parties took place will be discussed, 
which is conceptualized as an environment of emerging opportunities pursuant to the 
analytical framework. 
5.2.1 Proposition I: Policy Entrepreneurs 
Let us remind ourselves: policy entrepreneurs are “advocates for proposals or for the 
prominence of an idea [who are characterized by] their willingness to invest their 
resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future 
return … [including] in the form of policies of which they approve” (Kingdon, as cited in 
Mertha, 2009, p. 996).  
In contrast to other anti-incineration campaigns in Beijing such as Liulitun, Asuwei and 
Gaoantun, a campaign leader in the Nangong campaign expressed that “our primary goal 
for the campaign is to have the bank [KfW] and Beijing Municipal Government to 
monitor the process” – and thus, not the termination of the project. Instead, the group of 
ENGOs called for the existing monitoring system to be reviewed, deeming it “quite risky 
to build an incinerator” otherwise (Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 
19/03/13).  
This was partially due to the incinerator’s location: asked about the suitability of 
Nangong hosting an incinerator, one respondent pragmatically deemed it “not very bad, 
but not ideal” either. While criticizing the state strategy of constructing controversial 
facilities within areas of potentially weak resistance, and remarking upon a closer 
location to residential areas having possibly reduced shipment costs (and thus pollutants 
incurred during travel), one campaign leader nonetheless praised the relatively high 
distance of the Nangong incinerator from densely populated residential areas (Campaign 
Leader 1, personal communication, 19/03/13).  
As policy entrepreneurs, the group of ENGOs does not merely seek the abandonment of 
the incinerator project. Rather, the aim was to recast existing operating practices and 
policies by posing four interrelated demands: (1) meaningful participation opportunities 
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for the public, (2) improvement of operation practices, (3) information disclosure 
according to Chinese laws, and (4) a critical reassessment of China’s push for waste 
incineration. 
Participation not only features prominently in siting debates, but also in discussions 
about Chinese governance. According to one observer, participation is crucial at the 
intersection of written legislature and practical enforcement: “public participation in these 
issues is very insufficient…since there is no monitoring from the public, government and 
investors don’t care about the legal procedure” (Campaign Leader 1, personal 
communication, 19/03/13). In the same notion, the respondent projects a significant role 
on citizens in uncovering official wrongdoing: “When there are serious citizens 
emerging, and they look carefully at construction procedures, they can usually find many 
mistakes” (Ibid.).  
Another respondent elaborated upon the NGO’s perception of the problem: while 
participation during the planning stage is either non-existent or faked for the EIA, it is 
even more absent after construction: “During the operation, there’s no participation, no 
monitoring, no information disclosure, leading to poor governance and operation 
practices” (Campaign Leader 2, personal communication, 13/03/13).  
In the same notion, one respondent reflected upon the dimension of trust, a key variable 
in the NIMBY equation: “If you guarantee public participation and you follow all 
regulations, the public can trust the local government – but now, in China, this is not the 
case” (Campaign Leader 2, personal communication, 13/03/13).  
One reason mentioned for the absence of trust was the lack of clear announcement 
procedures: “we found that almost every incinerator building is either not announced or 
portrayed as something different, like a power plant” (Ibid.). 
Concerning the issue of a functioning system of supervision, one respondent assumed 
that it is simply a matter of costs (Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 
19/03/13). Due to outsourcing ownership and, by extension, supervision duties, local 
governments often circumvent the issue of high costs by conferring the responsibility of 
operation and supervision to private entities (Campaign Leader 2, personal 
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communication, 13/03/13). These duties are then neglected owing to absent external state 
control. The Nangong Incinerator thus represents a rather special case as it is “very rare 
that the government directly owns the project and will plan to manage it directly” (Ibid.).  
Against this background, one respondent mentioned the ineffectiveness of advanced 
incineration technology vis-à-vis collection and sorting mechanisms: “there’s no use for 
the machines” due to the mixed nature of the waste (Ibid.). Qualifying these remarks, one 
respondent remarked that “it’s not only the technology which counts, but the operation” 
(Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 13/03/13). While the KfW asserted that it 
will ensure a smooth operation of the project, it was nonetheless stressed that this could 
only be done to a certain extent given the KfW’s role as a financing development bank, 
and not as the operating company (KfW project manager, personal communication, 
17/05/13). 
With regard to information disclosure, most ENGO efforts have been channeled into 
obtaining the project’s EIA report – unsuccessfully, as of the publication of this thesis. 
Conducting an EIA is a mandatory exercise for waste incinerators, and according to 
Chinese environmental legislation, the EIA must be made available to the public. 
However, even though an EIA of the Nangong Incinerator has been conducted, “the 
public does not have access to the statement until now” (Campaign Leader 1, personal 
communication, 19/03/13) and continues to wait for the document. Applications to 
Beijing’s Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) for the disclosure of the EIA had been 
turned down (Ibid.). Likewise, calls aimed at the KfW to release the Nangong Incinerator 
EIA were turned down by the bank appealing to the ENGOs “understanding that we are 
not in a position to supply you with the project’s EIA” (KfW response 1). Ironically, by 
referring the NGOs to the “BMCCAE and other relevant institutions” (KfW response 2), 
the KfW seemingly internalized a frequently used approach of official Chinese state 
agencies of denying rights to information disclosure by discarding responsibility of the 
disclosure through referring to other, responsible institutions (Campaign Leader 1, 
personal communication, 19/03/13). 
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Asked about China’s push for waste incineration, one respondent assumed a holistic 
perspective by directing attention to a much larger problem of ineffective waste 
management policies in China: “government and scholars know very clearly that the best 
waste management system is prevention of waste first, and then re-use, separate waste, 
and recycle. But prevention of waste requires government to establish a policy calling 
upon the responsibility of producers – that will affect economic growth because it means 
less consumption, and the contemporary government feels very negative about this.” 
(Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 19/03/13).  
In order to provide a counter-narrative to the economic necessity of incinerators, the 
ENGO group thus intended to “reveal the true cost of incineration, the economic cost, the 
environmental cost” as a major objective of the campaign (Ibid.). In contrast, the KfW 
emphasized waste incineration as a necessity in densely populated cities with little 
available space. Referring to existing difficulties in obtaining licenses for landfills, as 
well as obvious problems of size and odors, incineration remained the only economic 
alternative according to the KfW (KfW project manager, personal communication, 
17/05/13). A solitary focus on recycling, as demanded by ENGOs, was deemed 
impossible to be implemented in rapidly growing cities.  Inevitably, waste treatment 
would make someone lose out – the goal was to minimize risks and affected individuals 
(Ibid.).  
Nonetheless, China’s push for incineration was criticized by the ENGO group because of 
a perceived policy prioritization of increased waste vs. recycling, asking in disbelief: 
“where is the incentive to do waste separation in the future when there are so many 
incinerators being built, designed for mixed waste?” (Campaign Leader 2, personal 
communication, 13/03/13). 
These four interrelated demands paint a clear picture: Chinese ENGOs have long bid 
adieu to a limited, project-focused role. Through active engagement and confident 
demands for public participation opportunities, greater and rules-based information 
disclosure, improved operation practices and a rethinking of not just Beijing’s, but entire 
China’s waste incineration strategy, the ENGOs perform as policy entrepreneurs in using 
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the Nangong incinerator project as a vehicle for grander claims about China’s 
environmental future. A distinct practice of how they engage with stakeholders – both 
Chinese and international – as exposed during the Nangong incinerator siting lies in issue 
framing, which the subsequent section deals with.   
5.2.2 Proposition II: Issue Framing 
The group of Chinese ENGOs was not content with merely preventing the Nangong 
incinerator from being constructed. Rather, the goal comprised attaining sustainable, 
long-term solutions for existing problems in the operation of incineration technology in 
China. In order to achieve these aims, the group of ENGOs framed their issue in two 
distinct ways: first, by telling the cautionary tale, they recounted the troublesome story of 
the existing Nangong composting plant in great detail and drew parallel projections about 
the planned incinerator. In a second step, they told the moral tale of providing insight into 
possible solutions, offered themselves as knowledgeable stakeholders, and detailed clear, 
cooperative suggestions on how this could be achieved. 
Communicated to the KfW via the first open letter, all projects in Beijing which the KfW 
had previously invested in were found “worthy of re-examination” (ENGO letter 1). 
Special attention was afforded to the site of the Nangong composting plant due to the 
close proximity to the planned incinerator (Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 
19/03/13). Opened in 1998 as Beijing’s first composting plant, the project was criticized 
by the group of ENGOs for being poorly supervised, operating under worker-hostile 
conditions as indicated by employees “separating waste without protecting gears” 
(Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 19/03/13), receiving highly mixed waste 
resulting in low-quality composting products (which is of particular concern as the 
Nangong incinerator is designated to receive waste from Majialou, the same transfer 
station), and discharging heavy odors (ENGO letter 1). 
Echoing the ENGOs, local residents have expressed frustration about heavy odors in the 
past, and subsequently exhibited a growing sensitivity to waste issues. Ultimately, this 
has led to several, yet localized and isolated instances of collective action in which 
residents have “blocked the shipment road of the garbage several times […] and then they 
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got compensation” (ENGO letter 1; Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 
19/03/13).  
Confronted with these allegations, the KfW remarked that it took the concerns seriously 
by forwarding the criticism to BMCCAE and organizing an on-site visit with personnel 
from both the KfW and BMCCAE, finding that operational problems “have existed some 
time ago, but were solved in the meanwhile” (KfW response 2). 
While the KfW insisted on not being legally responsible for the operation of the plant, the 
bank nevertheless offered their cooperation as a measure of good will. Nonetheless, a 
KfW project manager mentioned that the project (including monitoring, which generally 
lasts three years upon the start of operations) had been finally evaluated in 2001, which 
marked the end of all legal obligations for the KfW. According to KfW’s project 
manager, the responsibility to ensure the smooth operation had been transferred to the 
Chinese side of the contract long ago (KfW project manager, personal communication, 
17/05/13). 
Despite the reassurances of the smooth operation of the plant by the KfW, the Nangong 
composter was identified as worthy of reconstruction and expansion. Issues at stake 
include the poor state of technical subsystems and neighborhood complaints about odors 
in the area.  The upgrade is part of the 12th Five-Year Plan for the National and 
Economic and Social Development of Beijing, which stresses that “traditional disposal 
methods and depositing raw refuse into landfills shall be discouraged; waste incineration 
and biochemical treatments will be transformed, achieving a ratio of 4:3:3 for waste 
incineration, biochemical treatment and landfills”.14  
Secondly, the group of ENGOs framed the issue at hand as being resolvable by a close 
cooperation between the KfW and Chinese civil society organizations. Appealing to the 
KfW that the successful operation of the Nangong incinerator will “affect the reputation 
of German government and enterprises’ economic and environmental protection 
cooperation in China” (ENGO letter 1), the group of ENGOs offered several suggestions 
for a meaningful cooperation between the KfW and civil society organizations, as well as 
                                                 
14 The plan can be found in English here: 
http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/fzgh_1/guihua/12_5/Picture_12_F_Y_P/201208/P020120809377417514420.pdf 
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individual citizens. While the KfW did respond to the letter with an invitation to a 
meeting which did occur on September 4th, 2012, the group of ENGO’s expressed 
disappointment with regard to the KfW’s lacking willingness both to release information 
and to enter into a long-term dialogue (Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 
19/03/13). 
The KfW portrayed its own interpretation of the issue. Conversely to the group of 
ENGOs claims’ of poor operating principles, the bank framed the problem as context-, 
i.e. country-independent, insisting that there is “proven technology available to reduce to 
[sic] environmental impacts to an acceptable minimum” (KfW response 1), and that 
waste incineration is controllable and effective if high technological standards are 
employed during construction. Insisting that waste incinerators are commonly used in 
densely populated areas in Germany without causing great controversies, and that “close 
to our headquarters in the city Frankfurt, such a plant is located” (KfW response 1), the 
KfW framed the issue as a question of technological progress. This was echoed by KfW’s 
project manager, mentioning that planning for the Nangong incinerator started more than 
10 years ago and was envisaged as a pilot project with a role model function based on 
European norms and standards (KfW project manager, personal communication, 
17/05/13). 
Accordingly, ENGOs engaged in “issue framing” through creating a narrative of 
unavoidable poor operation practices, projecting conclusions from the existing Nangong 
composting plant onto the incinerator, and offering themselves as competent partners for 
the KfW. In the same notion, the written exchanges between the two stakeholders reveal 
the KfW as providing counter-narratives to the group of ENGOs’ frames of reference by 
insisting on the proven, applicable and context-independent power of waste incineration 
technology. While the KfW provided counter-narratives seeking to defuse tension and 
highlight capabilities (KfW project manager, personal communication, 17/05/13), 
ENGOs performed the role of policy entrepreneurs using issue framing to advance their 
institutional interests in a constrained political system, which nonetheless offers an 
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increasing amount of opportunities for political action. These opportunities form the 
subject of the next section. 
5.2.3 Proposition III: The Emergence of Opportunities   
As argued in chapter 4.1, China’s political system has become particularly malleable at 
the implementation level, enabling policy entrepreneurs to actively participate in the 
Chinese policy process. Nonetheless, these actors operate in a semi-authoritarian system 
which prescribes certain, explicit rules upon to participants.  
Against this background, the KfW is in a situation where it remains an actor tied to the 
Chinese policy process only by contractual obligations. Nonetheless, the KfW is judged 
by international standards on the one hand while being required to adhere to Chinese laws 
and customs on the other. The KfW thus serves a delicate, but crucial function at the 
intersection of strategy and implementation which is particularly pronounced given the 
long and extensive project focus of the Sino-German Financial Cooperation Framework 
(SGFCF) in which the KfW assumes a critical implementation role. In addition to several 
projects outside Beijing, the KfW was the leading agency during the construction of the 
Southern Beijing Disposal System between 1994 and 1998. Specifically, financially 
backed waste management solutions include a composting plant in Nangong, two transfer 
stations in Majialou and Xiaowuji, as well as two landfills in Anding and Beishenshu 
(Yu, 2008; ENGO letter 1). The Nangong waste incinerator represents a further effort by 
the KfW to implement projects under the SGFCF (Campaign Leader 1, personal 
communication, 19/03/13). Subsequently, the KfW assumes a limited, yet somewhat 
consistent role in the Chinese policy process, and is a potential focal point of entry 
through performing an intermediary function between state authorities and ENGOs.  
These ENGOs, in contrast, are permanent members of China’s political system. Having 
mushroomed since the early 1990s, they responded to an increasingly fragmented 
political system which allowed them the spaces necessary to form and navigate, to 
mounting environmental challenges in the course of rapid industrialization, and to what 
Ho (2001) terms the “greening” of the state, i.e. the realization that non-bureaucratic 
actors are necessary in dealing with the country’s imminent environmental problems. As 
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a result, ENGOs have emerged as representing “one of the most active areas of civil 
society in China” (Ho, 2007b), and have been lauded with being “at the vanguard of non-
governmental activity” (Economy, 2004, p.131). Nonetheless, they operate under the 
manifold constraints of an authoritarian system which tolerates an active green movement 
only if it remains localized, fragmented, non-confrontational and does not evolve into a 
boundary-transcending, organized political force (Ho, 2007a).  
In this environment, ENGOs rely on an increasingly diverse set of depoliticized 
instruments to advance their goals of meaningful participation rights and the enforcement 
of existing environmental legislation through the use of informal networks, coalitions 
with the media and new communication technologies (Xie, 2011; Yang, 2005; Sima, 
2011). In exemplifying fashion, international, cross-border networking played a 
significant role for the group of ENGOs during the Nangong incinerator campaign. Not 
only did responsible NGO staff contact academics for translating service and various 
assistance (environmental politics scholar from City University of Hong Kong, personal 
communication, 22/03/13), contact was also initiated with a German NGO in order to 
cross-check KfW statements and inquire about the situation of incineration in Germany 
(Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 19/03/13).  
Meanwhile, ENGOs operate under tight capacity constraints related to budget, time and 
availability of staff. Confronted with a tender notice on the German Trade and Investment 
website (GTAI) related to the Nangong incinerator’s technical equipment, one respondent 
cited a “lack of personnel to follow the issue” and being “distracted to other cases” as 
reasons for not knowing about the latest developments. Likewise, the crucial role of 
experts – both as citizens, but more so as NGO workers – was acknowledged. Referring 
to the KfW’s self-imposed social obligations, one respondent asserted that: “we need 
people that are familiar with the social responsibility of banks”, and “we need 
professionals who know Equator principles
15
 well, so we can compare the KfW’s 
behavior with the principles” (Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 19/03/13). 
                                                 
15 Equator principles are ”a credit risk management framework for determining, assessing and managing 
environmental and social risk in Project Finance transactions”. The KfW is a signatory of these principles. 
See: http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep 
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Seeking remedy for these constraints, ENGOs are actively looking for cooperative 
partners to build temporary coalitions. Despite the occasional tension and opposition 
between the group of ENGO’s and the KfW, the latter represents one such potential 
partner with a limited, yet demonstrated amount of resources and access to the policy 
process. As such, the group of ENGOs projected high hopes into a possible cooperation, 
assuming the KfW to be an “important interested party” which can “exert influence over 
this project” (ENGO letter 1). The KfW was thus perceived as being able to enter into 
bargaining processes with local authorities, using political spaces at the polity’s 
implementation gap. 
In the same notion, the involvement of an international actor as a financer was expressed 
as making “this case special” (Campaign Leader 2, personal communication, 13/03/13) 
and offering further potential benefits for the group of ENGO’s goals. Noting that the 
involvement of an international actor represented an “opportunity for us [the group of 
ENGOs] to intervene because it will attract more attention”, the possibility of 
implementing improved and more accountable governance systems in incremental steps 
was described as a possible result leading to a “good demonstration to other cases” 
(Ibid.). Against this background, the public perception of Germany as being a front-
runner in “waste management, social justice and sustainable development” was 
mentioned as another reason why the case would attract more attention if a contradiction 
between the KfW’s actions and values was assessed by the group of ENGOs (Campaign 
Leader 1, personal communication, 19/03/13). 
Likewise, the KfW’s origins were expected to facilitate a more rules-bound behavior in 
comparison to Chinese bureaucratic actors. Asked about the projection of high hopes in 
the bank, one respondent expected that “foreign companies must have more rules in place 
compared to China’s state-owned or private companies” (Campaign Leader 2, personal 
communication, 13/03/13). Similarly, the KfW itself promoted this assumption by 
writing that the KfW “request[s] the right to confirm all significant steps before and 
during implementing of such a project [with the BMCCAE]”, thereby elevating the 
KfW’s status onto potentially policy-changing levels (KfW response 1). 
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Despite these assumptions, the bank’s limited role in shaping waste management politics 
in China was acknowledged. “Our ultimate target is the local government because the 
bank cannot play the role of monitoring the process” concluded one respondent, all the 
same referring to possibly beneficial governance changes and increased local government 
responses through the “positive role” of the international actor (Campaign Leader 1, 
personal communication, 19/03/13). 
However, these hopes did not materialize into actual benefits as envisaged by the group 
of ENGOs. Initially with increased expectations, trust in the KfW’s “otherness” dissolved 
as the communication between the two parties progressed. Depicting this sentiment, one 
campaign leader expressed that “in the beginning, I was hopeful – a big bank and a 
foreign investor, I thought it will be smoother for us to move something forward. But 
actually, it turned out to be false”, leading the respondent to pass the final judgment of 
the KfW as displaying “no better performance” and being a “disappointment” due to 
specific questions being dealt with in a bureaucratic way (Campaign Leader 2, personal 
communication, 13/03/13).  
Another respondent rejected the notion of an increase in legitimacy due to international 
involvement: “I think there’s no big difference. Operation is more important. I think 
there’s no big difference whether the company is domestic or foreign, but the one 
difference is in the hope that the foreign company can disclose more information” 
(Campaign Leader 1, personal communication, 19/03/13). 
One of the reasons why the KfW failed to meet the expectations of the group of ENGOs 
was related to the former’s approach to dealing with the latter’s inquiries. Perceived as 
diverting responsibility away from the bank to Chinese authorities, one campaigner 
expressed frustration with the lack of cooperation on the KfW’s part, terming all 
responses as “bureaucratic” and lacking “a substantial release of information” both in 
general, and with regard to “their monitoring of the project” (Campaign Leader 1, 
personal communication, 19/03/13).  
A meeting between the group of ENGOs and representative KfW officers, initiated by the 
latter, reinforced these concerns rather than alleviate them. Given notorious levels of 
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distrust of civil society actors into local governments in China, one campaign leader 
surprisingly contrasted the lack of cooperation on KfW’s part with the efforts of the local 
Beijing Municipal Government, the latter which provided both more information and 
brought a representative of Poyry, the company in charge of the project’s consulting, to a 
dialogue meeting between all relevant stakeholders. While several aspects of this meeting 
were evaluated as positive and potentially nourishing for the future, the ENGOs two basic 
aims for the meeting – accomplishing EIA disclosure, and establishing a mechanism for 
citizens being able to go into existing incinerators to inform themselves about operation 
standards – were not reached due to the local government’s passiveness (Campaign 
Leader 2, personal communication, 13/03/13). 
Importantly, the large amount and quality of the ENGOs’ expectations were perceived as 
excessively optimistic by the KfW’s project manager (personal communication, 
17/05/13). Asserting that its contractual obligations with the BMCCAE put the KfW in a 
field of tension between NGO requests and limited navigation space, the bank asked the 
BMCCAE to take charge of communication efforts with the ENGOs (Ibid.). With regard 
to the frustration of the group of ENGOs about lacking information disclosure, the KfW 
reaffirmed that its contractual obligations forbade the bank to disclose the EIA, and that 
the ENGOs imposed excessively high expectations on the bank’s capacity in influencing 
project partners (KfW project manager, personal communication, 17/05/13). 
In formulating an open letter, engaging the media, and entering into dialogue with the 
KfW, the group of ENGOs has used political spaces which were previously inaccessible, 
and in which they were free from “being snuffed out by the coercive apparatus of the 
state” (Mertha, 2009, p. 997). Nonetheless, they lack the formal bargaining tools which 
other institutions – including, to a certain degree, the KfW – hold at their disposal. In 
circumventing fashion, ENGOs resort to different means such as raising awareness, 
appealing to the KfW’s self-imposed social guidelines, and projecting a high degree of 
expectations upon the bank in order to create leverage. Hence, they seek to co-opt the 
KfW as a partner in their struggle for improved governance due to the bank’s long history 
in constructing environmentally significant and financial weight. While the KfW did 
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respond to these attempts, they remain limited in their navigational freedom in China’s 
policy process.  
6. Discussion 
Incidents of NIMBY-protests in China are mounting, particularly in larger cities. This 
suggests an ample need to gain a better understanding of the determinants which lead to 
the escalation of siting conflicts. Despite the geographical proximity of the Nangong 
incinerator to other controversial waste incinerators in Beijing and the established 
knowledge of the interrelation between siting conflicts, there has been a puzzling absence 
of organized societal resistance against the Nangong incinerator as of May 2013. This 
makes it the only one of four incinerators in Beijing where such collective action has not 
appeared16. While this research cannot establish a correlation between international actor 
involvement and the absence of organized protests, the interactions between ENGOs and 
international stakeholders nonetheless offer several context-dependent lessons for facility 
siting processes in China.  
From honeymoon to reality 
Particularly in its infancy, the relationship between ENGOs and international actors has 
potential for extensive cooperation. However, this initial optimism deteriorates as a result 
of limited spheres of action for the international actor which are confronted with high 
expectations by ENGOs. Initially, the Nangong incinerator project gained legitimacy 
based purely on the presence of a renowned, international development bank among 
members of the group of ENGOs. As signified by the cooperative, space-transcending 
first open letter, as well as the meticulously researched content contained within, the 
group of ENGOs regarded the involvement of the international actor as a chance to not 
prevent the project, but to influence policy-making and operational procedures in a long-
term, non-localized way. Despite non-existent legal obligations to do so, the KfW 
responded to ENGO concerns in visiting the existing Nangong composting plant and 
                                                 
16 It deserves mention that the siting of the Asuwei incinerator was eventually perceived to be a 
cooperative, successful aggregation of community interests and state strategies. See Johnson (2013). 
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facilitated a meeting to discuss key issues. However, this honeymoon period of 
cooperation was rather short-natured. In performing their role of policy entrepreneurs, the 
group of ENGOs projected a substantial amount of expectations on the KfW, which the 
bank did not fulfill. Citing legal requirements to its contractual partners, the KfW 
refrained from disclosing substantial amounts of information to the ENGOs. Further 
constrained in their limited sphere of political action opportunities and the failure to act 
as intermediaries between the government and ENGOs, the KfW was effectively 
overwhelmed by the demands of the ENGOs, ultimately leading to the ENGOs’ 
perception of the KfW as being just another actor not adhering to existing legislative 
provisions. 
ENGOs seek to co-opt international actors 
ENGOs pursue a strategy of cooption to form an alliance with international actors. 
Lacking the capacity to enter into bargaining processes within the policy process 
themselves, the group of ENGOs pursued a strategy of seeking to coopt the international 
investor by creating narratives relating to existing operational issues of waste 
incinerators, and to the cooperative nature of the ENGO’s efforts. In their struggle for 
greater policy influence, the group of ENGOs hence performed the role of policy 
entrepreneurs in seeking to use the Nangong incinerator as a vehicle to effect policy 
change at the implementation level. While the KfW initially acted as intermediary 
between the government and the ENGOs and thus gave rise to further hopes by the latter 
for long-term cooperation and a “otherness” of the KfW, it were precisely these 
expectations which ultimately spelled the end of the cooperative relation between the two 
parties. 
ENGOs and international actors compete over narratives 
Using grand narratives, ENGOs compete with international actors over the sovereignty of 
interpretation. While the group of ENGOs framed their issue in telling the cautionary tale 
of existing problems in China’s operational governance of waste incinerators and 
outlined potential contributions of the group of ENGOs, the KfW responded by providing 
a counter-narrative in the form of insisting on the proven, applicable and context-
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independent power of waste incineration technology. This competition represents an 
obstacle for cooperation, but also provides a platform for the exchange of interests 
between the two stakeholders. 
A potential axis of de-escalation? 
As this thesis represents a qualitative, empirical work situated in the social sciences, 
experimental conditions which would allow for the control of confounding variables are 
absent from this study. While international involvement appears to be at least partially 
conducive to preventively de-escalating potential conflict, other factors are likely to have 
had an impact on the prevention of conflict in the siting of the Nangong incinerator. The 
proposed location, as mentioned by two campaign leaders, was not as controversial as it 
was in other cases in Beijing (such as Haidian). Likewise, the construction of the 
incinerator had not begun as of the publication of this thesis, and is likely to have at least 
an initial impact on resident’s perceptions of the incinerator. 
Nonetheless, opportunities for an international actor-ENGO axis remain. The image of a 
development bank being committed to offering sustainable solutions to pressing needs in 
waste management, regardless of how factually accurate, can be a powerful determinant 
in influencing the perceptions of stakeholders. Likewise, the shared interest in sustainable 
development solutions reflects a potential platform on which to discuss ideas. 
Additionally, international actors can reinstall one of the most important elements in the 
siting equation: trust in the siting process. If international actors assume the role of 
supervising and monitoring agency, low amounts of trust in established authorities which 
are associated with previous, coercive siting processes can possibly be compensated with. 
Tentatively, I thus suggest that there is potential, however small, for an ENGO-
international actor alliance. 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis set out with the aim to investigate the relationship between international 
actors and ENGOs in local siting processes in China. Based on semi-structured 
interviews and a documentary analysis, an intrinsic single case study inquiring the siting 
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of the Nangong incinerator with a particular focus on international actor-ENGO relations 
was conducted. Conducting this research was justified by an evident knowledge gap in 
existing research on facility siting in China which reflects a symptom of scholarly 
discussions being constrained by a narrow focus on industrialized economies. Through a 
qualitative inquiry into the relations of two actors during a siting process in China, this 
thesis pursued the aim of empirically contributing context-dependent insights to existing 
discussions on facility siting. Using fragmented authoritarianism as its anchor for data 
interpretation, the analysis suggests that (1) the relation between international actors and 
local ENGOs is marked by initial optimism but deteriorates fast due to excessive 
expectations of the latter, (2) local ENGOs act as “policy entrepreneurs” in seeking to co-
opt the international actor in the struggle for grander environmental concerns in siting 
processes, (3) communication between the two parties represents a struggle over 
competing narratives, and (4) while the relation between local ENGOs and international 
actors is complicated by limited spheres of action, it has potential to be an axis of de-
escalation in siting controversies. In conclusion, the implications of generated findings 
result in the suggestion of further comparative research into facility siting processes in 
emerging economies and non-liberal political systems, and recommend a watchful eye on 
international investor-ENGO relations.  
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9. Annex 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
(Researcher’s contact details included in original documents’ header) 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study, which will take place from March 4th, 
2013 to June 1st, 2013. This form details the purpose of this study, a description of the 
involvement required and your rights as a participant. 
The purpose of this study is: 
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- to gain insight into the Nangong incinerator, the international dimension 
of the project, the implications for project siting in Beijing/China 
You are encouraged to ask questions or raise concerns at any time about the nature of the 
study or the methods I am using. Please contact me at any time at the e-mail address or 
telephone number listed above. 
With your permission, I will tape record the interviews so I don't have to take notes. You 
will not be asked to state your name on the recording. The tapes will only be heard by me 
for the purpose of this study. If you feel uncomfortable with the recorder, you may ask 
that it be turned off at any time. 
Your responses to interview questions will be kept confidential. At no time will your 
actual identity be revealed. You will be assigned a random numerical code. I will be the 
only person transcribing the interview. The recording will be destroyed as soon as my 
master’s thesis has been graded (presumably June 2013).  
You also have the right to withdraw from the study at any time. In the event you choose 
to withdraw from the study all information you provide (including tapes) will be 
destroyed and omitted from the final paper. 
Insights gathered by you and other participants will be used in writing a master’s thesis, 
which will be read by my professor and presented and defended at Lund University, 
Sweden. Though direct quotes from you may be used in the paper, your name and other 
identifying information will be kept anonymous at all times.  
 
By signing this consent form I certify that I agree to the terms of this agreement.        
 
Interviewee:      ____________________________ (Signature)   ______________ (Date) 
Researcher:       ____________________________ (Signature)   ______________ (Date) 
 
 
SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
- Do you consider yourself an expert leader of this campaign? 
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- Since when have you worked on this campaign, the Nangong Incinerator? 
- Have you personally worked on other campaigns against waste incinerators? 
- What is your perception of the bank? Were they willing to disclose information to 
you, were they willing to share the information they had?  
- Waste incinerators as such aren’t necessarily bad. Throughout the world, they are 
used and they have certain advantages over other forms of waste management. 
Why do you think waste incineration is the right or wrong way forward for 
China?  
- In your open letter, you mentioned low-level mistakes that happened in planning, 
investment and operation. Why do they happen? Why do you think they happen 
so often? 
- Do you think Nangong is a suitable location for the incinerator? 
- How do you feel has your campaign changed because you had to deal with a bank 
from Germany? 
- Do you feel that the incinerator project has gained legitimacy because a German 
bank finances it? Do you think this has an effect on how local residents perceive 
it, or do you think it doesn’t really matter whether it’s a German company or a 
Chinese company? 
- Did you ever take part of a campaign where you had to deal with international 
stakeholders before? 
- Compared to other waste incinerators campaigns that you have participated in, do 
you feel this one is more difficult? Is it easier? 
- The announcement of the Nangong incinerator came in May 2010 via the Beijing 
General Municipal Engineering Design and Research Institute. Do you think that 
this was the right way to announce it? 
- Which state agencies did you engage in your campaign? How did you do it? 
- How much do local residents actually know about the Nangong incinerator?  
- Do you feel that international involvement in this campaign is a chance? Or is it 
an obstacle? 
